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The Fall and Hypertime , by Hud Hudson. Oxford University Press, 2014. 
Pp. 211. $65.00 (hardcover).
EDWARD WIERENGA, University of Rochester
In	this	exciting	and	challenging	work,	Hud	Hudson	attempts	to	stimulate	
the dialogue between religion and science by demonstrating the important 
role that analytic philosophy, especially metaphysics and epistemology, 
can play in that conversation. Analytic philosophy can particularly come 
to the aid of the theological side of the dispute by helping theology develop 
a formulation of doctrines that otherwise appear inconsistent with science.
The dispute that Hudson has in mind is not between science and re-
ligion	 generally,	 but	 between	 science	 and	 three	 claims	 of	 specifically	
Christian doctrine. Along the way, one of those claims is dropped from 
the discussion, and, in the end, Hudson’s positive support of the other 
two strikes me as disappointing and of dubious comfort to their adher-
ents. But the path to that conclusion is stimulating and illuminating, with 
connections to a range of interesting literature, astounding and original 
philosophical, especially metaphysical, claims, and a delightful writing 
style that makes the entire journey an exciting adventure.
The doctrines in which Hudson is interested are those of the Fall, Origi-
nal	Sin,	and	Original	Guilt.	The	Fall,	as	recounted	in	Genesis	3,	is	the	first	sin	
of	Adam	and	Eve	in	the	Garden	of	Eden	and	the	consequent	corruption	of	
their nature and of the world. According to the doctrine of Original Sin, all 
of the descendants of Adam and Eve, which includes everyone, are them-
selves inclined or disposed to sin. In addition, according to the doctrine of 
Original Guilt, all of these descendants are also themselves guilty of the sin 
committed	by	their	remote	ancestors,	Adam	and	Eve.
In	the	first	chapter	Hudson	gives	a	description	of	the	dialogue	between	
science and religion and sets up his claim that “philosophy . . . deserves 
a clearly marked place at this conversational table” (1). This is followed, 
in chapter 2, with a description of the development of the three doctrines, 
primarily in western (Latin) Christianity as drawn from some biblical pas-
sages	and,	especially,	under	the	influence	of	Augustine.	Hudson	notes	a	
variety of ways in which these doctrines have been formulated and leaves 
it open whether the Fall “is to be construed as a genuinely historical event 
involving	a	first	or	primal	sin	or	as	a	non-historical	shared	sense	of	separa-
tion”	(22).	He	also	leaves	it	open	whether	the	consequence	of	that	sin	was	
a	corruption	merely	of	the	original	agent	or	whether	it	was	transmitted	to	
that agent’s progeny and, if so, whether the corruption is a mere privation 
of	a	divine	gift	or	“an	inescapable	and	crippling	state	of	disordered	desire	
tempting one to ever further sin,” which in its harshest interpretation is 
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“a desperate plunge into total depravity” (22). The rest of this chapter re-
counts discoveries in astronomy, physics, evolutionary biology, and other 
sciences that seem inconsistent with traditional understandings of these 
doctrines. For example, the universe and our solar system are each way 
too	old	for	the	account	in	the	first	two	chapters	in	Genesis	of	the	creation	
the world and its inhabitants to be accurate (24), geological history does 
not suggest any “special and protected location,” like the Garden of Eden, 
where “inhabitants were safe from the powerful natural forces that tore 
continents apart,” and, in any case, “disease, death, and extinction” long 
precede	any	human	presence	or	activity	and	is	thus	not	a	consequence	of	
the	first	human	sin.	In	addition,	modern	humans	originated	in	savannahs	
in	Africa	rather	than	in	Mesopotamia,	and	our	first	ancestors	capable	of	
moral failure “were separated by many millennia from the farmers and 
shepherds	portrayed	in	Genesis	as	the	first	post-Fall	generation”	(25).
Chapter 3 presents several “concessive strategies,” reinterpretations of 
the three doctrines, designed to make them more palatable. In the case 
of Original Guilt (to be considered again in the following chapter), the 
prospects are not promising. Except to the extent that it presupposes the 
other	two	doctrines,	and	is	thus	subject	to	objections	to	the	latter,	the	pri-
mary	objection	to	it	is	not	scientific	but	moral:	it	charges	us	with	guilt	for	
an event that happened long before we were born and which we had no 
power to prevent. The bulk of this chapter consists of an extended presen-
tation of and commentary on Peter van Inwagen’s “literary refashioning 
of	materials	drawn	from	myth	and	legend”	in	his	Gifford	Lectures	(The 
Problem of Evil [Oxford University Press, 2006], 84), which Hudson thinks 
is “overwhelmingly plausible” (43). In this story, God controlled the course 
of evolution, and he gathered a breeding community of human ancestors 
to whom he gave free will (to enable them to love) and whom he raised 
to rationality. These human beings lived in harmony and protected each 
other from harm, disaster, and disease. Thus, there was no evil in their 
part of the world, until they separated themselves from their relationship 
with God. The results were that they came to face destruction by violence 
and they developed an inborn tendency to do evil. There are many more 
particulars to the story, including statements of God’s planned response to 
this situation, and Hudson’s discussion of them is detailed and illuminat-
ing. I will simply note some of Hudson’s conclusions. He takes the story to 
invoke a historical fall and occurrence of original sin that could contribute 
to a defense against the problem of evil (53) and that by not including 
references	 to	 specific	 individuals,	 times,	 and	places,	 it	 “steers	 clear”	 of	
the	findings	of	natural	science	that	seem	incompatible	with	the	traditional	
versions	 of	 the	doctrines.	 Surprisingly,	 this	 story,	when	filled	 out	more	
fully than my brief summary, might provide all that is needed to establish 
a compatibility between the results of science and these two Christian doc-
trines,	suitably	revised,	without	requiring	an	appeal	to	Hudson’s	primary	
conjecture, the “Hypertime Thesis.”
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The story from van Inwagen does not mention anything supporting 
Original Guilt. Indeed, Hudson concludes the chapter by saying that he 
himself	 is	not	 committed	 to	 that	doctrine	 (54);	nevertheless,	he	devotes	
the next chapter, 4, to a discussion of a strategy of defending the doctrine 
against objections. These objections claim that the doctrine falsely charges 
us with guilt for an event that we had no power to prevent because it 
happened long before we existed. It is here that Hudson introduces some 
high-powered	metaphysics.	(Hudson	acknowledges	here	the	influence	of	
Michael Rea, “The Metaphysics of Original Sin,” in Peter van Inwagen 
and Dean Zimmerman, eds., Persons: Human and Divine [Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2007], 319–256.) He appeals to Four-Dimensionalism, the view 
that things that persist through time, including human persons, are four-
dimensional objects that have temporal parts at various particular times. 
Hudson is sympathetic to Four-Dimensionalism in part because of its abil-
ity	to	deal	with	(imagined)	cases	of	fission.	If	someone	undergoes	a	brain	
bisection	with	each	hemisphere	implanted	into	a	different	brainless	body,	
with the original body being destroyed but the freshly encephalonized 
bodies being living persons, it would be “absurd” to say that the resulting 
persons are each identical to the original person because “the resulting 
persons are two, not one, and . . . identity is transitive” (61–62). Instead, 
according to the formulation of Four-Dimensionalism Hudson prefers, 
there are two persons all along. Prior to the transplant they had shared 
the same body—they had the same temporal parts—and later they do not. 
Hudson’s formulation of Four-Dimensionalism also allows for temporal 
gaps in a thing’s existence. This feature and the possibility of sharing tem-
poral parts open a possible response to the objection to Original Guilt. 
Supposing that there was one original sinner, Adam, the proposed solu-
tion suggests that Adam initially shared all of his temporal parts with 
every	human	being	who	was	born	after	that	first	sin.	After	the	sin,	Adam	
underwent	fission,	and	all	of	the	other	people	with	whom	he	shared	those	
temporal parts—beginning with his children and continuing until all of 
us at the present time—have a gap in their existence. Since everyone over-
lapped	Adam	at	 the	 time	of	 the	first	sin,	we	all	had	the	same	power	of	
prevention he had. Thus, the objection is mistaken in claiming that we 
had no power to prevent that act, and it was not something that happened 
long before we existed (63). (Hudson does not consider how Eve became 
infected with Original Guilt. Eve came into existence before Adam sinned, 
so she did not share a temporal part with him when he sinned. In addi-
tion, according to Genesis 2:16–17, God’s command not to eat the fruit of 
the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was issued before Eve came 
into existence, so she seems not to be subject to that command, either. 
Here is a proposal: Eve did share temporal parts with Adam prior to her 
being fashioned—sharing a rib is at least sharing a part of a part!—so the 
command applied to her as well as to Adam, and her action was thus 
also a sin.) Hudson follows his initial presentation of this defense with 
an intricate and instructive series of objections and replies. In the end, 
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he rejects the defense of Original Guilt. Among other reasons, he holds 
that the temporal parts of Adam, existing thousands of years ago, do not 
stand in the right psychological or causal relations to our temporal parts 
shortly	 after	 our	 births	 for	 these	 parts	 to	 be	 stages	 of	 the	 same	person	
(67–68), and he rejects the suggestion due to Rea and Jonathan Edwards 
that the connection is “grounded in an objective similarity determined by 
God to serve the function of uniting certain pluralities of person-stages 
into a single person” (69).
Chapter 5, “Metaphysics and the Hypertime Thesis” introduces the re-
ally serious metaphysics, mentioned in the title of the book and discussed 
in most of the rest of it, the Hypertime Hypothesis. I think that the Hyper-
time Hypothesis is the claim that there is such a thing as hypertime, but 
perhaps it is the weaker claim that it is possible that there is such a thing 
(88).	 In	 either	 case,	we	 can	 at	 least	make	 an	 effort	 to	 understand	what	
hypertime is. Hudson introduces it by mentioning several understandings 
of what existence and spacetime are like. According to Presentism, only 
present things exist—things from the past no longer exist, and things in 
the future do not yet exist. In contrast, Eternalism holds that past, present, 
and	future	things	all	exist.	On	the	latter	view,	spacetime	(89),	the	universe	
(190), or Reality (the term Peter van Inwagen uses in his description of 
hypertime, an account that Hudson cites; see van Inwagen’s “Changing 
the Past,” in Dean Zimmerman, ed., Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 
5 [2010], 3–28, 14), is a Block, a four-dimensional slab of three-dimensional 
objects and the fourth dimension of time. The presentist could admit 
something like an extremely thin slice of the Block (or hyperplane) ex-
isting	very	briefly	and	being	replaced	by	new	such	slices	at	each	instant	
of time, but according to presentism, no larger block ever exists. A third 
view, the Growing Block universe combines elements of both of these views. 
Past	objects	exist	forever	after,	but	future	objects	do	not	yet	exist.	Thus	the	
Growing Block is like a Block for all times prior to the present, but at each 
instant it has a leading edge that is like the slim slice of the presentist. As 
time goes by, what was the leading edge retreats back into the Block as 
new leading edges are continually added to the front of the Block.
Early discussions of the Growing Block theory assumed that there had 
to be a “second temporal dimension” (86) in order to measure the rate at 
which the Block grew. Although many defenders and opponents of the 
view	came	to	believe	that	the	Growing	Block	did	not	require	the	existence	
of such a second temporal dimension, Hypertime, Hudson regards it as a 
philosophically useful idea that can be used to measure alternative combi-
nations	of	spacetime	points	that	coexistence	at	different	times	(81).
Of	course,	there	would	be	no	difference	between	what	happens	at	or-
dinary times and what happens at hypertimes unless some remarkable 
changes occur in the universe. One example, mentioned by Hudson (88), 
is van Inwagen’s (2010) discussion of time travel, in which if at t2 someone 
travels in a time machine back to an earlier time t1, then the part of the 
Growing	Block	that	came	after	t1	is	lopped	off	and	the	Block	regrows	at	the	
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normal	rate	but	most	likely	in	a	different	way.	According	to	ordinary	time,	
after	t1 it will always be the case that there was an arrival of a time machine 
in the past, so the time travel does not really change the past. But the past 
as measured by hypertime will have changed, for an observer of hyper-
time will realize that it hyper-was the case that there was no time machine 
at hyper-t1 but that hyper-later it hyper-was the case that a time machine 
arrived at t1. In the case of the annihilation of a chunk of the block, ordi-
nary time resets to the current leading edge, whereas hypertime sort of 
loops back to the current leading edge while maintaining all of the hyper-
instants	it	has	previously	recorded.	(This	point	about	what	is	required	for	
hypertime	to	differ	from	ordinary	time	suggests	another	interpretation	of	
the Hypertime Hypothesis, namely, that it is the claim that actuality con-
tains “other spacetime blocks located hyperearlier and hyperlater” [128], 
that is, that reality truly does have some features that hypertime tracks 
differently	from	ordinary	time.	Further	support	for	this	interpretation	is	
found late in the book, when Hudson says that the Hypertime Hypothesis 
is one of several “alternative portraits of a multiverse” [171].)
Although Hudson mentions using the resources of hypertime to allow 
for backwards time travel (88), his own extended example (89–91) is that 
of	a	disastrous	escape	in	space	chosen	by	Captain	Quag.	After	things	end	
badly,	the	entire	final	Block	until	shortly	before	Quag’s	calamitous	initial	
decision is annihilated and in its place a favorable history grows, begin-
ning	with	Quag	plotting	his	interstellar	voyage	in	an	importantly	different	
direction.	Hudson	does	not	say	what	brings	about	the	cutting	off	of	a	large	
chunk of the block, although, as we see when we get to his last chapter, he 
thinks that this is something God could do.
One	final	bit	of	detail:	Although	Hudson	develops	his	explanation	of	
hypertime by linking it to the Growing Block, he thinks that it could be as-
sociated	with	the	Eternalist	Block	and	with	Presentism	(108ff.).	In	addition,	
Hudson mentions several other conceptions of blocks, including Shrinking 
Block and Disappearing Block. Of particular relevance is Morphing Block 
(82–88), which allows that the Block could be “slimmed down” by having 
inner sections removed, like the way in which the Growing Block could 
have	its	final	section	cut	off.	In	addition,	Hudson	also	thinks	that	a	block	
could have an alteration of everything preceding its leading edge (89). 
This	last	claim	will	be	important	in	the	final	chapter	of	the	book.
Before returning to the topic of the fall, Hudson devotes three chapters 
to	 other	 applications	 of	 the	Hypertime	Hypothesis.	 The	 first	 addresses	
topics in epistemology and asks whether responses to skepticism could 
be adapted to skepticism about Hypertime. Hudson concedes that many 
would think it to be “a bit of fantastical, speculative metaphysics, more 
suitable	 as	 a	 source	 of	 science	 fiction	 than	 for	 engaging	 seriously	with	
ourselves and the world” (115), but he argues that “we do not know it to 
be false” (132–133) and that it is at least an epistemic possibility.
The next chapter begins with a discussion of historical and recent ac-
counts	of	divine	omnipresence,	and	it	identifies	a	list	of	puzzling	issues	
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any	adequate	account	should	address.	In	previous	work	(The Metaphysics 
of Hyperspace [Oxford University Press, 2005], chapter 5), Hudson had 
appealed to recent work on the metaphysics of location or occupation of 
material objects. He now repeats some of those ideas in order to apply 
them to the location of any object, including a divine being. The leading 
notion is the concept of entends. An object entends just in case it is entirely 
located at a region (it is located at that region and no part of it is located 
outside that region), it is wholly located at that region (no proper part of 
it is not located at that region), and it is wholly located at every subre-
gion of that region. A material object that entends is an extended simple. 
Hudson thinks that it makes sense to say that God entends, and he shows 
how this view can address the puzzling issues about omnipresence. His 
discussion is lucid and sophisticated, although hypertime plays no role 
in it. Hypertime returns to the scene with the next topic, divine eternality. 
Here Hudson appeals to his suggestion that God’s location depends on 
his entension and proposes that God is present in this way at every hyper-
plane. Accordingly, God is present at the hypertime associated with each 
hyperplane. If hypertime is distinct from ordinary time, “locating God in 
hypertime would furnish a non-temporal realm from which God could 
create and interact with the world” (155).
In the penultimate chapter Hudson displays a trio of objections to the 
existence of God, formulated as contradictory triads which include claims 
about	insufficient	justification	for	evil	and	the	absence	of	a	best	possible	
world—I am suppressing important details here. Hudson’s reply to these 
objections is to suggest that what exists is a multiverse and that what we 
take to be the world is really just one partition of a vast array. Things could 
have	been	better	than	the	small	part	that	appears	to	us,	but	the	multiverse	
as a whole “provides a stage on which God can create everything worth 
having	simply	by	partitioning	goods,	rather	than	being	forced	to	sacrifice	
one good to obtain another” (177). There is much that I fail to grasp here, 
but perhaps the most important one for this review is the role the Hyper-
time Hypothesis is supposed to play here. How does it contribute to the 
overall value of the multiverse that its various partitions or regions are 
somehow all connected by a single dimension of time, beyond it simply 
being	the	case	that	such	a	variety	of	components	exists?	As	Hudson	had	
put it in his earlier treatment of these issues, without mentioning hyper-
time, “the many independent regions of a plenitudinous hyperspace pro-
vide	.	.	.	the	resources	to	affirm	a	perfectly	good	sense	in	which	both	God	
creates the best world and our own world is not the best” (The Metaphysics 
of Hyperspace, 166).
In	the	final	chapter	Hudson	returns	to	the	two	themes	with	which	the	
book begins, namely, the doctrines of the fall and original sin and the claim 
that these doctrines are not incompatible with the claims of recent science. 
Hudson begins by suggesting a way in which a literal interpretation of the 
biblical account of the fall could have happened (or at least, could have 
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hyper-happened). Hudson tells a story in which at a very early hypertime 
in the block universe
God created a spacetime and its contents whose earliest stages of growth 
witnessed the forming of a man from the dust of the ground, the planting of 
a garden into which he was placed, the adorning of that garden with trees 
and rivers, the imposition of a restriction on his diet, the presentation and 
naming of the animals, the extraction of a rib from and creation of a com-
panion for him, the fateful discourse of a snake . . . and a rebellion that took 
the form of eating forbidden fruit. As the block grew, this once naked and 
innocent pair fashioned clothing, [and] . . . confessed their disobedience. . . . 
Finally, driven out of the garden, they and their world underwent a spec-
tacular change.
 At the hypermoment the pair exited the garden . . . God annihilated every 
piece of the block save that region on its outermost edge thus occupied by 
these ancestors of ours and then embedded that very region and its contents 
in a new bock—a block sporting a several-billion-year history, replete with 
ice ages, long-dead hominids, dinosaurs, . . . even a big bang.
 In fact, their brave new world—the very block universe that is hyperpre-
sent now—is remarkably accurately described in great detail by the many 
branches of contemporary science. Moreover, this special pair of our ances-
tors themselves had ancestors from whom they descended in precisely the 
manner taught by evolutionary biology. (190–191)
What is in the past now, according to ordinary time, is determined by the 
features	of	the	blocks	that	are	now	in	the	past.	Thus,	after	the	replacement	
of the block prior to the expulsion from Eden with a vastly larger block, 
there are now blocks of the universe featuring ice ages, early hominids, 
and the rest. So, all of that is now past. But what “separates history from 
hyperhistory	is	quite	simply	that,	whereas	for	each	instant	of	hypertime,	
the facts about what is past and present are determined by the features of 
the block in existence at that hypertime, the features of the block at one hy-
pertime need not constrain its features at other hypertimes” (188, also 89). 
Accordingly, there is a hypertime in the past where the block in existence 
at that hypertime included our human ancestors who lived an idyllic life 
in a lovely and safe garden and were completely innocent. Thus, there 
hyperwas such a couple living such a guiltless life.
How does this story establish that biblical literalism is compatible with 
the	deliverances	of	current	science?	Hudson’s	claims	are	that	the	Hyper-
time Hypothesis makes this story possibly true and that science has not 
shown that the Hypertime Hypothesis is false. He thus concludes that the 
claims of science are compatible with this story. As he puts it, “for all I 
can	tell,	 [the	scientific]	worldview	is	consistent	with	a	metaphysics	 that	
permits us to eat our cake and hyper have it too—that is, that allows us to say 
that there never was such a garden but also that there hyperwas” (192).
The claim that although there never was such a garden but there hyper-
was is not likely to satisfy literalists, who seem to claim that this story oc-
curred in our own past. Moreover, they typically deny many of the claims 
of modern science, for example, about the age of the earth, the origins 
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of species, and the extinction of dinosaurs before the existence of human 
beings. Perhaps there is another story that would handle some of these 
disputes. Suppose that God created another block in which all species, 
including dinosaurs, come into existence at the same time, that pairs of 
all	of	them	load	on	the	Ark	and	stay	there	while	a	flood	covers	the	earth,	
and	then	God	slips	this	block	briefly	between	two	hyperplanes	before	an-
nihilating it. If this happened, there hyperwould have been dinosaurs on 
the	Ark	and	there	hyperwould	have	been	a	great	flood,	even	though	there	
were not. Additional manipulations like this might succeed in bringing 
more	things	literalists	affirm	into	the	hyperpast.	But	they	still	would	not	
bring such things into our own past. Hudson realizes that his story does 
not put the Garden of Eden into our own past but only into our hyper-
past. His response, however, is only that the traditional commitment that 
the Genesis events happened “may prove to be a commitment neutral 
between history and hyperhistory” and that if his insertion of them into 
hyperhistory is “ultimately rejected on theological grounds” he has never-
theless successfully blocked “conclusive dismissal of literalism by way to 
appeal to the science of our modern world view” (193). I think, however, 
that literalism with respect to a person or an event is stronger than the 
claim that the person exists or the event occurs in a block that is possibly 
but	at	most	temporarily	attached	to	or	a	part	of	reality.
I am also not convinced that Hudson’s story has all of the features he 
claims	for	it.	One	is	his	claim	that	after	the	large	scientifically	accurate	past	
is	attached	to	the	leading	edge	containing	the	expulsion	from	the	Garden,	
“this special pair of our ancestors themselves had ancestors from whom 
they descended in precisely the manner taught by evolutionary biology.” 
When van Inwagen’s time machine arrives at an earlier time, neither the 
machine nor its occupant has a cause at that time. That is because merely 
being	in	a	hyperplane	that	is	placed	directly	after	another	hyperplane	does	
not establish any causal connection between the two slices. For the same 
reason,	 that	 special	pair	would	not	have	acquired	any	of	 their	 traits	 or	
genes	from	anything	in	their	newly	acquired	past.	I	also	am	not	persuaded	
that this pair, even if they really did end up in our history, are our ances-
tors, at least not the ancestors of very many of us. This is because many of 
us today are descended from human ancestors whose trek out of Africa 
did not include a schlep through ancient Mesopotamia and thus are not 
descendants of the more recent couple from the Garden. But if this is right, 
then	Hudson’s	story	offers	no	support	for	Original	Sin,	because	most	of	us	
do not have the right connection to that pair of sinners.
I have ended this review with some criticism of Hudson’s concluding 
chapter. But this should not detract from the fact that there is so much in 
this book of great interest, including topics I have not had space to men-
tion, all discussed in ingenious and interesting ways. 
